12 — SmartBridge¶
Category: ICS / Web (KNX/IP cloud bridge: SSRF → stolen mTLS cert → cEMI passthrough) | Difficulty: Insane
Flag: HTB{cl0ud_tru5t_15_bu5_tru5t_l3g4cy_p455thr0ugh_w1ns}
How I found the flag¶
Scenario: Helia's cloud bridge fronts the Central Government District's KNX/IP building-automation bus — everything from lobby lighting to secure-wing access control. The bus's audit canary holds a ticket nobody outside the integrator should be able to claim. Three services: BMS HMI (read-only dashboard, polls /api/state), Helia bridge portal (docs + /tools/preview), and the MQTT broker (mqtts, mutual-TLS).
Architecture (reversed from the portal docs): cloud → edge → bus. Actuation flows as AWS-IoT-shadow state.desired documents published over mqtts to $aws/things/cgd-knx-bridge-001/shadow/update; the bridge validates them against a GA allowlist and forwards cEMI L_Data.req frames to KNXnet/IP on 127.0.0.1:3671/udp (loopback only). Three trust layers: mTLS client cert (CN → per-thing topic ACL), GA allowlist (mains 4 life-safety / 5 access-control BLOCKED), and the secure-wing interlock.
Chain (all four layers broken):
- SSRF filter bypass —
/tools/previewfetches a URL from the bridge box, but a resolve-then-check filter blockslocalhost/127.0.0.1/ decimal2130706433/0.0.0.0/[::1]/ IPv4-mapped[::ffff:127.0.0.1]. The box has no outbound DNS, so redirect/DNS-rebind are dead. Bypass = alternative IPv4 encodings thatipaddressrejects as literals (so the loopback check is skipped) butrequests/getaddrinfostill resolves to 127.0.0.1:http://127.000.000.001:8081/...(also octal0177.0.0.1, hex0x7f.0.0.1). - Steal the mTLS identity — SSRF to the internal cert minter
http://127.000.000.001:8081/internal/cert/issue?thing=cgd-knx-bridge-001; the preview echoes the JSON response = client cert + private key + CA for the thing ("treat the thing certificate as the master key to the building"). - mTLS to the broker — the broker enforces client certs (plain connect →
TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED). Raw MQTT CONNECT over TLS presenting the stolen cert →CONNACK rc=0(client-id =cgd-knx-bridge-001to match the ACL). legacy_payloadraw-cEMI passthrough — commissioning_mode lefttrue(go-live default). The shadow'sdesired.legacy_payloadcarries a hex cEMI frame that the bridge forwards verbatim, without the GA allowlist → drives the blocked main-5 access-control GAs.
Interlock (HEL-CGD-503) — three stages, not a bare write: state at 5/0/98 (0 idle / 1 armed / 2 tripped) → arm = long-frame cEMI write of the 14-byte ASCII magic AUDIT-CANARY-1 to 5/0/99 (DPT 16.001, NPDU = payload_len+1, APCI byte stands alone) → release = short-frame GroupValueWrite 1 to 5/0/100 while armed (release-while-not-armed is silently ignored). GA 3-level → 16-bit: (main<<11)|(mid<<8)|sub, so 5/0/99 = 0x2863, 5/0/100 = 0x2864.
Winning line: publish two shadow updates over the one mTLS MQTT session —
- arm:
legacy_payload = 1100bce0000028630f008041554449542d43414e4152592d31 - release:
legacy_payload = 1100bce000002864010081
→ mantrap armed → tripped, door LOCKED → UNLOCKED, audit_ticket_released: true; the ticket surfaced in the HMI /api/state.